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BAR BRIEFS
One of the greatest jury lawyers that we ever had in this state was
a man who used short words and simple langauge. He talked to the jury
in their own language, realizing that juries are made up of uneducated
men as well as the educated. The farmer knew what he meant because
he used the words of the farm. The shop keeper missed nothing be-
cause he knew shop. He was able at one term of court to win twenty-
two verdicts out of twenty-five cases on the calendar.
Young lawyers will impress juries more with strong, simple lang-
uage that each juror will understand, rather than by trying to impress
them by using complicated legal terms and long, involved phrases.
After all the point in view is to win the case, rather than to impress the
jury with the learning of the lawyer.
M. A. HILDRETH, President.
MEMBERS OF OUR ASSOCIATION WHO HAVE PASSED
AWAY RECENTLY
Anthony Faber, 65 years of age, of Bismarck, N. D., passed away
on March 21, 1936; he had practiced in Morton and Burleigh counties
since October 16, 1906.
Harry W. Stewart, 32 years of age, of Langdon, N. D., passed
away April 25th, 1936; he had been assistant states attorney of Cavalier
county for the past seven years.
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
G. Gerhardt, et al, Plaintiffs and Appellants, vs. Etheline Heid, et al,
Defendants and Respondents.
SYLLABUS: 1. The Constitution of North Dakota guarantees
to all "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and wor-
ship without discrimination or preference." (Const. N. D. sec. 4.)
2. Under the Constitution of North Dakota (Const. N. D., sec-
tions 147-152) no money raised for the support of the public schools of
the state may be appropriated or used for the support of any sectarian
school; all schools supported by a public tax must remain under the
absolute and exclusive control of the state, be open to all the children of
the state and free from sectarian control.
3. A sectarian school is a school affiliated with a particular relig-
ious sect or denomination or under the control or governing influence
of such sect or denomination.
4. Control is the act or fact of controlling; power or authority to
control; directing or restraining domination.
5. The employment as teachers in the common schools of North
Dakota of nuns, members of a religious society of the Roman Catholic
Church, who are duly qualified as teachers under the laws of the state
of North Dakota; is not violative of sections 147 or 152 of the state con-
stitution.
6. What particular teachers, of those who possess the legal quali-
fications to teach, shall be employed is a matter for the directors of the
school district to determine and is not ordinarily a matter for judicial con-
sideration.
7. The conduct of sectarian religious exercises and the giving of
sectarian instruction in any of the public schools of North Dakota is
prohibited by the constitution.
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8. The fact that a teacher in the public schools of North Dakota,
who is a member of a religious order, wears the habit of the order while
engaged in teaching and contributes a portion of her earnings to the
order, standing alone cannot be said to make the school a sectarian
school, to remove the school from the absolute control of the state, or
to place the school under sectarian control.
From a judgment of the District Court of Stark County, Miller, J.,
plaintif f's appeal.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
Filed April 15, 1936.
State of North Dakota upon the relation of A. F. Lehr, Respondent,
vs. J. A. Weiler, as County Auditor of LaMoure County, North
Dakota, Appellant.
SYLLABUS: 1. The filing of a notice with the County Auditor
by the owner of land sold for taxes, claiming the benefits of Chapter
280 of the Session Laws of North Dakota, 1935, is by the express terms
of that act made a condition precedent to the extension of the period of
redemption thereunder.
2. Record is examined, and it is held, that since the owner of the
land filed no notice claiming an extension of the period of redemption
from tax sale as provided by Chapter 280 of the Session Laws of North
Dakota, 1935, the County Auditor cannot refuse to issue a tax certificate
upon the ground that said chapter has extended the period of redemption.
APPEAL from the District Court of LaMoure County, Hutchin-
son, J.
AFFIRMED: Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
A. J. Goetz, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. G. A. Hubbell, Defendant
and Respondent.
1. Under the statute of frauds an agreement for the sale of real
property is invalid unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing and subscribed by the party against whom the agreement
is sought to be enforced.
2. To render such memorandum sufficient, it is not necessary
it be signed by the other party to the agreement.
3. Such memorandum need not be a complete contract in itself.
It is the written evidence of the contract, and while parol evidence may
not be introduced to vary the terms of such memorandum, nevertheless
parol evidence may be introduced to explain the same and make it cer-
tain.
4. Written receipts, signed by the party to be charged, which show
that part of the purchase price of real estate described in the receipt has
been paid by the other party and which sets forth the purchase price and
a description of property is a sufficient memorandum to take an agree-
ment out of the Statute of Frauds and parol evidence may be introduced
to supply proof in harmony with the statements made in the receipts and
in explanation thereof.
5. With proof of the contract furnished by the memorandum as
required, the court will enforce the contract as made by the parties, and
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the party sought to be charged cannot be required to accept payment
in any other manner or form than that agreed upon.
SYLLABUS: Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan Coun-
ty, Hon. R. G. McFarland, Judge. MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
ALIMONY LIMITING LAW RULED CONSTITUTIONAL
Estranged husbands and wives Saturday studied the Illinois supreme
court's decision approving a law limiting alimony to ascertain how it
would affect their cases.
The tribunal ruled Friday at Springfield that the Graham act-
providing that a childless woman can claim alimony for only two years-
was constitutional.
By the same 4 to 3 decision, the jurists also upheld the act's provision
that two years of separate maintenance may be classed as legal deser-
tion and used as grounds for a final divorce decree.-Associated Press.
INSTITUTE MAKES PROGRESS IN TORTS RESTATEMENT
At the May meeting of the American Law Institute the Torts group
is submitting for consideration and suggestions a substantial amount
of material in the law of Deceit and Defamation. The interesting and
difficult problems involved in both these thorny topics have been de-
veloped and dealt with as well as the group can do it without the further
help which is brought by approaching from different points of view.
In the meantime, preliminary work goes forward into other parts
of that conglomerate subject we call Torts. The next set of problems
for consideration are those commonly known as "Slander of Title."
The name is not a good one. It has just enough connection with the
problems involved so that it is not wholly misleading. The conduct
which may create liability upon a defendant is something like that in-
volved in liability for slander. And the thing defendant does as a basis
of liability is the speaking or writing of words, as in defamation cases.
The injury of which the complainant complains is, in some cases under
this head, something which casts doubt upon his "title" to land or chattel.
But the scope of invasion of the plaintiff's interest is not limited to
title cases and the rules which determine defendant's liability show only
vague similarity with the rules determining liability for defamation.
Labels in law or elsewhere have no intrinsic importance. We could
pin a Greek letter to the various types of problems in the field of Torts
as a means of classification and the device would work well enough
if lawyers knew what was comprehended under each letter. The
danger of an inaccurate label is that it may mislead one who relies upon
the label instead of examining the product. This is as true in law as it
is in the field of medicinal products.
The accurate description of the problem in which work is begun
is found in the phrase "Language Which Invades Interests in Vendi-
bility of Property and Other Interests." Perhaps from further thought
upon the subject a title equally accurate and less ponderous can be found.
The subject is less well known and less litigated than most of the ques-
tions involved in negligence and even libel and slander. There is com-
paratively little literature upon it. But it is practically important and
apt to become increasingly so in an era where legal disputes have shifted
from questions on land titles and the like to problems arising out of a
complicated industrial and commercial society.
